Paradox of Self-Amendment by Peter Suber 60. James Cargile, "On Omnipotence," Nous, 1 (1967) 210-05, at pp. 202-03. On other acts beyond the power of a deity that should not count against its omnipotence, see Richard Swineburne, "Omnipotence," American Philosphical Quarterly, 10 (1973) 231-37, passim. 61. Ronald M. Dworkin, "The Model of Rules," University of Chicago Law Review, 35 (1967) 14-46. However I disagree with Dworkin that Hart is one who has tried to draw this line rigidly. See Section 6.A, and Section 7.A. The alegal, social nature of acceptance precludes any complete separation of legal and moral standards. Hart, op. cit., at pp. 165ff. 62. See Orfield, op. cit., at pp. 9, 53, 78f, 156. 63. Indeed, Hart may be criticized for obliterating the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate government to the extent that he allows equal validity to all outcomes of all procedures validated by the rule of recognition. The distinction is restored if acceptance can overrule the rule of recognition at every stage. This is the chief modification of Hart's theory that I employ. 64. Hart argues that unjust laws are not for that reason alone invalid, op. cit., at pp. 201-07. 65. I do not mean to imply that the difficulty and fairness of amendment and the legitimacy of a legal system are inversely proportional all the way up and all the way down each scale, although I deliberately conceive legitimacy as a matter of degree. Nor do I mean to imply that the difficulty and fairness of amendment is the only, or even the primary, determinant of legitimacy. However a more complete account of legitimacy is considerably beyond the present topic. 66. The issues of the continuing omnipotence of acceptance and the contingency of validation will be taken up again and in more detail in Section 21. 58