Paradox of Self-Amendment by Peter Suber another.[Note 25] This problem can become very real and troublesome. As England's former colonies and dominions won their independence, by war or negotiation, England wanted a way to seal their independence by law. In 1931 it adopted the Statute of Westminster, solemnizing its intention never to legislate for former colonies again without their express consent and request. That was direct and thorough; the problem is that the Statute of Westminster is a statute and can be repealed, which could mean that the independence of the former colonies and dominions is revocable by England.[Note 26] This was quickly noticed by courts in the former colonies. It appeared that one generation of English people had done its best to surrender this right to legislate, but had done so with frustrating incompleteness, since any later generation could restore it. This was a world-class cartoon of the child with flypaper on its fingers trying to shake it off. Nothing that England could do, it seems, could give the colonies full legal independence, for if it were done in law, then it could be undone; and if were not done in law, it would not be lawful. England was learning that it is paradoxical to command another to be free or even to offer another their freedom as a gift. One tempting solution was to interpret the Statute of Westminster as irrevocable. That would guarantee that the emancipated countries would stay emancipated. But it would also contradict the independence of the English people, their sovereignty in their own country, and deny them the power to change their own laws. More succinctly, the English Parliament for these reasons cannot bind its successors irrevocably. Following this line of reasoning Parliament ruled in 1935 that the Statute of Westminster could in principle be repealed. British Coal Corporation v. The King, A.C. 520. So the paradox of liberation remains. To avoid the problems of revocable independence, many former colonies have deliberately inserted some irregularity or procedural defect into the ritual of liberation so that they could say they owe their independence to peaceful revolution, not to the Statute of Westminster.[Note 27] The equivalent problem arises in U.S. law in the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, in which the United States agrees to give the Philippines independence in exchange for making a constitution for themselves according to U.S. specifications. In Section 10 (a), the United States promises that, when a suitable Philippine constitution is ratified, "the United States shall by proclamation withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty then existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippine Islands...." The Philippine Independence Act, like the Statute of Westminster, is merely a statute; if Congress cannot bind itself irrevocably, then the statute can be repealed by the United States at any time. If after a certain time repeal would have no effect on the independence of the former dependent, which is almost certainly the case, then legal formalism cannot explain it. J. Permissible disobedience The phenomenon of de jure toleration or justification for acts that depart from requirements of valid law presents a neat contradiction. Reflexivities enter in different ways. Disobedience of certain kinds may be permitted because the legal system as a whole is perceived as self- limiting, because a statute is self-excepting, because the disobedient act is self-justifying, because the act is self-concealing and unreviewable, or because the act itself, while disobedient to existing law, has law-making power and so amends or repeals rather than merely violates. The decisions of a common law judge inconsistent with relevant precedent (consciously overruling it, or simply disregarding it) are in an important sense departures from valid law, but they become law themselves. The precedents they violate are amended or overruled pro tanto or to the extent of the conflict. In international customary law, a dearth of custom may exist on a certain issue but all of it may point in the same direction. An act departing from that custom may be a delict or the beginning of a new custom —a violation or an amendment. Some laws may mischievously be interpreted to mean, in effect, that certain acts are forbidden only until committed. Suicide is the classic example, but there are many more interesting examples. The current international law on the minerals of the deep seabed arguably says that the minerals extracted are the property of the taker while the minerals in place are the common heritage of mankind and not to be taken. Some commentators have suggested that it would be illegal for an oil company to drill for oil in the deep seabed, but that any oil so taken would legally belong to the oil company. The situation is similar to drug laws that penalize sale and purchase, and perhaps possession, but not use. Much law and commentary exists on the problem of "implied repeals" of old statutes by new statutes, old statutes by new cases, old cases by new cases, and old law of all kinds by new interpretations. These cases show the importance of distinguishing the type of law-making act employed in the earlier and the later laws in conflict. Otherwise we will never clearly answer the question whether new acts inconsistent with existing law are violations or repeals. Laws may be self-excepting when they require their own publication in order to take effect and then are not published on account of some intrinsic feature. This happens occasionally with administrative regulations or state statutes on obscenity. In order to avoid the vagueness problems that might invalidate them under the First amendment, they must be graphic and explicit. But that makes them obscene to many people. In one case a publisher refused to print the statute because he thought he was prevented by the very statute to be published. The paradox is tightened when we realize that, for reasons of notice and due process, the statute is of no force until it is published. International law forbids intervention in the internal affairs of another state (with some exceptions) about as clearly as it forbids anything. The value promoted by this prohibition is the self-determination of the people of the state. Currently international law is very much unsettled on the question whether intervention is permissible to further self-determination, e.g. by aiding democratically minded insurgents against a dictator's army. 139