Paradox of Self-Amendment by Peter Suber that, like totally self-repealing sunset clauses, effective date clauses frequently occur in the very sections they control. And as with sunset clauses, we can tighten this language in order to examine the logic of the problem: This section, including this very sentence, shall become effective to all intents and purposes only at... But even if the solution can be made applicable to statutes, it cannot apply to effective date clauses, or ratification clauses, in constitutions.[Note 8] Article VII of the federal constitution states that the document of which it is a part shall become effective when ratified in a certain way. In the two years between its drafting in 1787 and its ratification in 1789, Article VII authoritatively told courts and all interested parties that the new constitution was not yet effective. One cannot argue that Article VII had already been approved in the proper way and governed only the rest of the constitution. An even stronger example may be found in Article 13, Section 1, of the Missouri constitution of 1865: The preceding parts of this instrument shall not take effect unless this constitution be adopted by the people, at the election to be held as hereinafter directed... The Article then proceeds to direct an election as if already binding law.[Note 9] The Article clearly excepts itself as if it could be valid before the rest of the constitution, but of course that is the sheerest fiction. If the fiction is taken at face value, then we have a very clear case of constitutional self-justification (see Section 7.B). The federal ratification clause, Article VII, left the ratification elections in each state to the initiative of proponents and did not presume to order them as if it were already binding law. One may ask whether a Missouri court in 1864 would have heard a writ of mandamus ordering the election required by the ratification clause of the unratified constitution. Approved statutes and unratified constitutions awaiting effectiveness are clearly different. The statutes may be assigned some provisional validity, or their effective date clauses assigned some exceptional validity, while this cannot be done with constitutions. The reason is that the statutes have already been approved in the manner appropriate for statutes, and need only the condition stipulated in the effective date clause in order to become effective. Falling in between statutes and constitutions in this regard are treaties that have been signed by representatives but not yet ratified by the signatory states. Article III of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 required its signatories to ratify the pact in accordance with their various domestic procedures for ratification. This "requirement" suggests that the Pact was already binding law; but if it was, then ratification would be unnecessary. If a signatory state failed to ratify, would it violate the treaty, or would it for that very reason exempt itself from the treaty's provisions? Finally we may observe that effective date clauses may do some of the work of sunset clauses and cause self-repeal. The Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the direct election of senators, contains the following clause: This amendment shall not be construed as to affect the election or term or any Senator before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. When the amendment was ratified in 1913, this clause became generally inapplicable. Only senators who had a grievance arising from the pre- ratification period, or bodies intending to interfere with senatorial elections or terms in the pre-ratification period, would ever have to appeal to the clause prior to ratification. If they did appeal to the clause prior to ratification, however, they would find an unratified proposal, not law. The unratified proposal would still have some use as a reliable guide to how courts would act after ratification. But if a senator did have a grievance under the clause, she would have to wait for the amendment to be ratified for this clause to be authoritative. And of course some remedy would be available even if the amendment were never ratified, since even without the clause it remains the case that unadopted proposals are not law and should not affect the elections or terms of senators. So by becoming explicit in an amendment proposal, the clause is generally useful only upon ratification (so that it is lawful) and is generally useless upon ratification (because the period of its intended application is over). By the time of its effective date, it has canceled itself. Notes 1. The amendment proposal had two other, more substantial defects that led to the Court's judgment: (1) it violated the procedures of amendment by initiative by failing to give the full text of the proposed amendment, and (2) it purported to amend Article 4, Section 11, which was itself subject to a sunset clause and had expired in 1881, while the existing procedures on redistricting were contained in Article 4, Section 7. People v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375 (1872) asserted a commonly held view of temporary provisions of constitutions: they are not favored, they cannot be interpreted to clash with the "general design" of the constitutions, and in conflicts with other provisions they must yield. 2. On the issue of particularity the court said at id. 694 that a proper constitutional rule on redistricting simply points out a plan or method for such redistricting, and prescribes permanent rules and principles for carrying out such method or plan. On the other hand, the matter of actually redistricting is a matter of very temporary character. On the need for changing the provision the court said at id. 694 that senatorial districts depend on population, which changes, and that it was never contemplated under our present constitutional scheme to incorporate as a part of the permanent and fundamental law of the state a provision which must of necessity demand frequent alterations and changes. 103